Francienna Grant v. Omni Health Care Systems of NJ by unknown
2011 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-5-2011 
Francienna Grant v. Omni Health Care Systems of NJ 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011 
Recommended Citation 
"Francienna Grant v. Omni Health Care Systems of NJ" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 1284. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/1284 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 09-4403 
_______________ 
 
FRANCIENNA B. GRANT, 
       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
OMNI HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS OF NJ, INC.;  
ADVANTAGE REHABILITATION, LLC; RONILDA PULIDO,  
individually and in her official capacity as Regional Director 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 1:08-cv-00306) 
District Judge:  Honorable Renee Marie Bumb 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 26, 2011 
_______________ 
 
Before: SLOVITER and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges, and POLLAK, Senior 
District Judge
*
 
 
(Opinion filed May 5, 2011) 
_______________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________ 
 
 
                                              
*
 Honorable Louis H. Pollak, District Judge of the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
POLLAK, District Judge 
 Because we write primarily for the parties, who are of course fully familiar with 
the background of this case, we set forth only the facts and procedural history that are of 
central relevance to our decision.  On January 16, 2008, plaintiff Francienna B. Grant 
filed a complaint against defendants Omni Health Care Systems of NJ, Inc., Advantage 
Rehabilitation, LLC, and Ronilda Pulido, asserting a claim for employment 
discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and assorted state common law claims.  On 
August 13, 2009, following a year of discovery characterized by numerous delays, the 
defendants filed an Order to Show Cause to Compel Discovery, Award Sanctions, 
Preclude Evidence, and Dismiss Claims for Failure to Prosecute.   
The District Court‟s opinion on the motion, issued on September 24, 2009, 
described in painstaking detail how plaintiff and (especially) her attorney, Marshall L. 
Williams, “repeatedly failed to comply with the [Court‟s] scheduling orders, despite 
numerous extensions, disregarded the Federal Rules of Procedure and professional 
conduct, and ignored this Court‟s many warnings threatening sanctions.”  App. at 45.  
Despite finding that “Plaintiff‟s and her counsel‟s misconduct in this case warrant 
dismissal,” the District Court, in a spirit of “patience and generosity,” declined to dismiss 
plaintiff‟s case.  Id.  Instead, the Court gave plaintiff the opportunity to produce all 
outstanding discovery responses by October 23, 2009, and warned plaintiff and Mr. 
Williams that “NO FURTHER EXTENSIONS FOR DISCOVERY WILL BE 
GRANTED FOR ANY REASON WHATSOEVER” and that “FAILURE TO HEED 
THE COURT‟S FINAL WARNING WILL RESULT IN DISMISSAL OF THE CASE.”  
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Id. at 48-49 (emphasis in original).  The Court also concluded that monetary sanctions 
against Mr. Williams were warranted, and ordered the defendants to submit a fee 
application listing all fees and costs incurred as a result of his discovery misconduct.  Id. 
On October 26, 2009, the District Court dismissed plaintiff‟s complaint with 
prejudice, finding that plaintiff had not complied with the Court‟s September 24, 2009 
order to produce all outstanding discovery.  On May 4, 2010, the District Court issued 
orders denying plaintiff‟s motion for reconsideration and partially granting defendants‟ 
motion for monetary sanctions against Mr. Williams.   
Plaintiff raises two arguments in this appeal.  First, plaintiff argues that the District 
Court abused its discretion by dismissing plaintiff‟s complaint and imposing sanctions 
upon Mr. Williams.  We will affirm the District Court‟s September 24, 2009, October 23, 
2009, and May 4, 2010 orders for substantially the reasons given by the District Court in 
its thorough and carefully reasoned opinions, which convincingly demonstrate that 
dismissal of plaintiff‟s complaint and the imposition of monetary sanctions against Mr. 
Williams were warranted under our precedents.   
 Second, plaintiff argues that the district court erred by “vacat[ing] the Magistrate 
Judge‟s referral . . . without good cause and without extraordinary circumstances as 
required by 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(4).”  Appellant‟s Br. at 18.  This argument borders on the 
frivolous and will be rejected.  There is no evidence that the District Court designated the 
Magistrate Judge to preside over this case pursuant to Section 636(c), or that the parties 
4 
 
ever consented to such a designation.
1
  Instead, the district court docket demonstrates that 
the Magistrate Judge‟s rulings were made pursuant to Section 636(b).  During the 
litigation, the Magistrate Judge issued only non-dispositive orders, such as scheduling 
orders, while the District Court Judge decided all dispositive motions, such as the motion 
to dismiss and the motion for summary judgment.
2
  While it is true that in June 2009 the 
District Court did assume responsibility over all aspects of this case, including  
discovery, under Section 636(b) the District Court was not required to make any showing 
                                              
1
 Section 636(c) grants magistrate judges full authority “to preside at and enter 
final judgment in civil trials, including those tried before a jury, upon the written consent 
of the parties and the special designation of the district court.”  Taberer v. Armstrong 
World Industries, Inc., 954 F.2d 888, 903 (3d Cir. 1992).  Once the parties consent to the 
designation of a magistrate judge under Section 636(c), the district court may “for good 
cause shown on its own motion, or under extraordinary circumstances shown by any 
party, vacate a reference of a civil matter to a magistrate judge under this subsection.”  28 
U.S.C. § 636(c)(4). 
Magistrate judges have more limited authority under Section 636(b).  See Taberer, 
954 F.2d at 903 (Under Section 636(b), “magistrates may be designated to . . . hear and 
determine any pretrial matter,
 except for eight categories of „dispositive‟ pretrial matters; 
and conduct hearings and recommend dispositions with regard to the eight excepted 
matters.”).  Designations under Section 636(b) may be made “without regard to the 
parties‟ consent.”  Beazer East, Inc. v. Mead Corp., 412 F.3d 429, 438 (3d Cir. 2005).  
Unlike Section 636(c), Section 636(b) contains no limitation on a district court‟s power to 
resume control over a case that has previously been referred to a magistrate judge.  See 
28 U.S.C. § 636(b). 
2
 The District Court did not enter an order specifying that the Magistrate Judge was 
being designated to conduct proceedings under Section 636(b).  We have noted that 
“good practice would indicate that court orders of designation or reference state plainly 
under what statutory provision the court is proceeding.”  Beazer East, 412 F.3d at 437 
n.10 (internal quotation and alteration omitted).  Nonetheless, the division of labor 
between the District Court and the Magistrate Judge during the course of the litigation 
makes it clear that the designation in this case was made pursuant to Section 636(b), not 
Section 636(c). 
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of good cause or extraordinary circumstances in order to do so.  Accordingly, we reject 
plaintiff‟s argument that the District Court committed error under Section 636.   
For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
 
